skills to a better understanding of the weapons build-up that many observers thought had heavily contributed to the outbreak of this terrible war (1919; 1938; 1960) . To that effect, Richardson asked the question, "Why are so many nations reluctantly but steadily increasing their armaments as if they were mechanically compelled to do so? " (1960:12) . His answer was threefold. First, each state feels the need to develop weapons when there exist grievances sufficiently serious to justify going to war. Second, the decision to develop weapons is tempered by the costs imposed by the diversion of economic resources to military production. Third, there are factors independent of expenditure that contribute to the development of weapons.
Entrenched in the traditional (Bismarckian) understanding of international relations, these considerations did not receive immediate widespread recognition because Richardson developed his thesis during the 1920s and 1930s, and it was only published after the Second World War. The nuclear revolution of the late 1940s gave him a platform for success. As there was an urgent need to find a way of managing the nuclear phenomenon to avoid world destruction, many intellectuals, Bernard Brodie in the lead, embarked on studying weapons proliferation. Because there was no empirical data (other than technical data on the physics of fission, fusion, and ballistics), the subject logically invited theorizing in a Richardsonian way. A few simple deductive ideas, based on a small number of assumptions, seemed to offer a convincing framework of analysis that could easily side-step the lack of historical evidence (Betts 1997:14) . And so Richardson's work became widely acknowledged and further developed into a theory, which came to be known as "realism"-and was subsequently applied to all types of weapons of proliferation concern (Carr 1946; Morgenthau 1948; Bull 1977; Waltz 1979) .
What are the arguments put forward by realists? Interestingly enough, they make two opposing claims. Some realists argue that states develop weapons to maximize their power-and so tend to adopt offensive strategies designed to modify the status quo. Other realists, however, contend that states proliferate primarily to protect their security-and so adopt more defensive strategies intended to maintain the status quo.
According to some realists, states inherently wish to wield power. As international relations professors Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson put it, "the statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers " (1985:165) . To illustrate their claim, power-focused realists often refer to the lessons of Ancient Greek Historian Thucydides's famous "Melian dialogue"
